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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1972 TERM
serve to calm those fears by limiting access to a reporter's sources in
civil cases only to those whose disclosure goes to the heart of the under-
lying case and only in instances where independent effort to discover
the desired information has been made. Moreover, the clarity with
which Baker balanced the relevant interests will serve as an example
for the method of inquiry to be utilized in future litigation involving
the newsman's privilege.
JUSTICIABILITY OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER
Holtzman v. Schlesinger
The constitutionality of United States military activity in Indo-
china pursuant to executive mandate1 has been the subject of consider-
able discussion 2 and litigation in the federal courts.3 The extent of
N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1973, at 1, col. 4. This action was precipitated by leaks of information
pertaining to the investigation of criminal activity allegedly attributed to Mr. Agnew.
Eight subpoenas were served on various news organizations and reporters in a search for
sources close to the investigation. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 6. Although the
probable controversy was eventually mooted when the Vice President resigned, very serious
questions were involved. In light of the Baker and Branzburg approach it is clear that a
prospective criminal defendant's interest in securing an impartial jury may well outweigh
the privilege accorded the media to protect their sources.
I Presidential war powers derive principally from article II, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion providing that "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy.. ." and the reservation of presidential war making power in the article I, section
8 grant to Congress of the power "to declare war." In the debate over whether Congress
should be granted the power to "make" or "declare" war, the framers desired to allow
some war making power to reside in the Executive, especially the power to repulse
sudden attacks without first consulting Congress. 2 REcoPos OF THE FEDmAL CONVENTION
OF 1789 at 318-19 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). See Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and
the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5-8 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29 (1972); Moore
& Underwood, The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam,
112 CONG. R.-c. 13232-33 (daily ed. June 22, 1966); Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Con-
stitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 VA. L. REv. 1243 (1969); Schwartz & McCormack,
The Justiciability of Legal Objections to the American Military Effort in Vietnam, 46
TExAs L. REv. 1033 (1968); Van Alstyne, Congress, the President and the Power to Declare
War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1972); 116 CONG. REc. 7117-23
(daily ed. May 13, 1970) (Yale Paper, Pt. 1); 116 CONG. REc. 759-93 (daily ed. May 21,
1970) (Yale Paper, Pt. 2); Note, Congress, The President, and the Power to Commit Forces
to Combat, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1771 (1968); (Special Issue) 50 B.U.L. REv. (1970).
3 Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (original jurisdiction); Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, rehearing en banc denied, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1973); Mitchell
v. Laird, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1973); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973);
Mattola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'g 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970);
Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 929 (1972);
Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Pietsch v. President of the United States, 434 F.2d 861
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.
1970); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970);
1973]
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congressional participation in the decision to commit American forces
has been an issue central to almost all of the debate. This has been
so not only where the disputed activity was the overall conduct of the
Vietnam war itself,4 but also when incidentals thereto, such as the
incursions into and bombing of Cambodia5 and the mining of North
Vietnam's harbors and rivers,8 were questioned. Except for two district
court decisions7 which were subsequently overturned on appeal, all
plaintiffs seeking judicial declaration of the unconstitutionality of these
activities have been denied relief for failure to state a "case or contro-
versy." Suits have been dismissed for plaintiffs' lack of standing, moot-
ness, and non-justiciability of the subject matter.8
Morn v. McNamara, 887 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934
(1967); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967);
Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), afJ'd without opinion, 411 U.S. 911 (1978):
Campen v. Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Gravel v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C.
1972); Head v. Nixon, 342 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La.), aff'd without opinion, 468 F.2d 951
(5th Cir. 1972); DaCosta v. Nixon, 55 F.R.D. 145 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 456
F. 2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1972); Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970).
For cases in which the constitutionality of the Vietnam war was challenged as a de-
fense by alleged draft law violators see Mattola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178, 179-180, nn. 4 & 5
(9th Cir. 1972). See also Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1310 n.3 (2d Cir. 1973).
4 Second Circuit cases include DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 869 (1971); Pietsch v. President of the United States, 434 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970); DaCosta v.
Laird, 55 F.R.D. 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
5 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).
6 DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
7 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307
(2d Cir. 1973); Mattola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd, 464 F.2d 178
(9th Cir. 1972).
8 See 484 F.2d at 1310 n.3 for compilation of cases challenging the legality of the
Vietnam war. Courts have held that the question of American military involvement in
Southeast Asia is nonjusticiable because it is political and cannot be settled under
"judicially discoverable and manageable standards."
The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the
separation of powers. Much confusion results from the capacity of the "political
question" label to obscure the need ... for case by case inquiry. Deciding whether
a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another
branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever
authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional in-
terpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution....
Prominent on the surface of any ease held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potenti-
ality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question.
Baker v. Car', 369 U.S. 186, 210, 217 (1962) (emphasis added).
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The controversy between President Nixon and the Congress over
the continued bombing of Cambodia, subsequent to repatriation of
American forces and prisoners, resulted in a compromise, viz., the
Joint Resolution Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal 1974.0 This
enactment required cessation of United States military activity relative
to Cambodia as of August 15, 1973. Congress' failure to terminate the
bombing immediately prompted Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman
of Brooklyn and several Air Force officers to bring suit in the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York seeking a determination
that United States military activities in Cambodia were illegal as with-
out congressional authorization. Judge Orrin Judd granted summary
judgment to the plaintiffs; he declared that United States military
activity in Cambodia was unlawful"0 and enjoined further military
activity in or over Cambodia." In Holtzman v. Schlesinger the Second
Circuit reversed the district court.12
Prior to the district court decision in Holtzman, no federal court
has ever attempted to restrain United States military activity in Indo-
The Baker guidelines for determining whether a court should refuse to adjudicate
a claim on the ground that it presents a political question were applied to the Vietnam
War in Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Gil-
ligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) wherein the Court overturned a decision requiring
the district court to supervise the Ohio National Guard in the wake of the Kent State
killings on the ground that there were no "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards."
For history and discussions of the development of the political question doctrine
see Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd without opinion, 411 U.S. 911
(1973); Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REv. 338 (1924); Scharpf, Judicial
Review and The Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966);
Tigar, Judicial Power, The "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1135 (1970).
In general, the decision of a court to abstain may be constitutionally mandated if
the matter in question "has in any measure been committed by the constitution to
another branch of government." 369 U.S. at 211. Othervise it is a matter of discretion.
See Schwartz & McCormack, The Justiciability of Legal Objections to the American
Military Effort in Vietnam, 46 TXLAs L. REv. 1033, 1041, 1046-72 (1968).
9 Pu3. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 134 (July 1, 1973), provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no
funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to
finance directly or indirectly combat activities by the United States military
forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam,
Laos or Cambodia.
361 F. Supp. 553.
10 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, Docket No. 73-C-537 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), quoted in 484
F.2d at 1308: "[Tjhere is no existing Congressional authority to order military forces
into combat in Cambodia or to release bombs over Cambodia, and ... military activities
in Cambodia by American armed forces are unauthorized and unlawful...."
1- Id.
12 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'g 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). The defendants
were enjoined from "participating in any way in military activities in or over Cambodia
or releasing any bombs which may fall in Cambodia." Id.
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china."" Judge Judd's order never took effect as the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit immediately stayed and subsequently dissolved
the injunction.14 Judge Mulligan, writing for the majority, 5 con-
sidered the issues of justiciability, congressional authorization and
standing.
The court first tackled the question of justiciability. Judge
Mulligan was of the view that the threshold question was whether
judicial intrusion into the controversy was barred by the political ques-
tion doctrine.'" In Orlando v. Laird7 the Second Circuit had previously
answered this question in the negative. Relying on Baker v. Carr,1
Orlando held that to the extent that congressional approval was neces-
sary to conduct a war, a justiciable issue was present.19 Since congres-
13 The constitutionality of United States military activities in Indochina had never
been adjudicated by the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed without opinion the three-
judge court decision in Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd without
opinion, 411 U.S. 911 (1973) which dismissed the complaint because it presented a politi-
cal question. The Court denied leave to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to file an
original bill contesting the constitutionality of United States military activity in Indo-
china, Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) and has denied certiorari in all other
cases in which review of the war was sought.
14 The events which followed the district court decision are documented in 484 F.2d
at 1308, and are included for the reader's convenience. The stay was granted by the
court of appeals on July 27, 1973 and argument of the appeal was set for August 13,
1973. Mr. Justice Marshall, Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit, denied an application
to vacate the stay on August 1, 1973 and noted that the date of argument of the appeal
could be advanced. - U.S. - (1973). Argument was advanced to August 8, 1973 on the
unopposed motion of the plaintiffs. On August 4, 1973, upon plaintiffs' application, Mr.
Justice Douglas issued an order vacating the stay. - U.S. - (1973). Later in the same
day, Mr. Justice Marshall, after polling the remaining members of the Court and re-
ceiving their unanimous approval, issued an order reinstating the stay and overruling
Mr. Justice Douglas. - U.S. - (1973). An August 3, 1973 petition for an en banc hearing
was denied on August 6, 1973. The argument of the appeal took place on August 8,
1973 and the decision of the court was announced the same day.
15Judge Timbers joined Judge Mulligan as the Holtzman majority. Judge Oakes
dissented.
16 484 F.2d at 1309.
17 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US. 869 (1971).
18 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See note 8 supra.
19 The Orlando court said "The test is whether there is any action by Congress suf-
ficient to authorize or ratify the military activity in question" and concluded that there
was "no lack of clear evidence to support a conclusion that there was an abundance of
continuing mutual participation in the prosecution of the war." 443 F.2d at 1042. The
court added,
Beyond determining that there has been some mutual participation ... it is clear
that the constitutional propriety of the means by which Congress has chosen to
ratify and approve the protracted military operations in Southeast Asia is a
political question. The form which congressional authorization should take is
one of policy, committed to the discretion of the Congress and outside the power
and competency of the judiciary, because there are no intelligible and objectively
manageable standards by which to judge such actions.
Id. at 1043.
The court in Orlando found sufficient congressional authorization without relying
entirely on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Id. The First Circuit has similarly found suf-
ficient congressional participation to legalize the war. Massachusetts v. Laird, 327 F.
[Vol. 48:262
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sional authorization involved discernible activity, a determination of
whether or not it existed could be reached by applying judicially
discoverable and manageable standards. This position was adopted by
the Holtzman court.20
Having concluded that the legality of the war was justiciable to
the extent of whether Congress participated in the commitment of
military forces, Judge Mulligan turned to the question of whether the
court could determine if the participation was sufficient to authorize
the action. In ruling that it was not, the court found DaCosta v. Laird21
(DaCosta 1) in point. In DaCosta I, the Second Circuit, per Judge
Kaufman, considered that the mutual participation of Congress and
the President in winding down the war in Vietnam was a political
question.22 However, in DaCosta 11123 the court stated that it did not
"pass on the point ...whether a radical change (as opposed to a
winding down) in the character of war operations ... might be suf-
ficiently measurable judicially to warrant a court's consideration, i.e.,
might contain a standard which we seek . .,24
The Holtzman plaintiffs, seizing upon this dicta, claimed that "the
character of the war operations" had so radically changed so as to
require new congressional participation, and that the time was ripe
to determine whether "judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards" existed. They cited, as factors relevent to this determination,
prior congressional participation, newly voiced congressional disap-
proval, the Vietnam Accord and the continued fighting in Cambodia.
District Judge Orrin Judd accepted this interpretation of DaCosta
11125 and noted that current congressional participation was question-
able in view of Congress' subsequent disapproval of the war expressed
by its repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution2 and enactment of the
Mansfield Amendment.27 He concluded that a radical change in the
Supp. 378 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 451 F.2d 26 (Ist Cir. 1971). But see Mitchell v. Laird, - F.2d
- (D.C. Cir. 1973) (initial prosecution of the war may have been illegal).
20 484 F.2d at 1309.
21448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972), wherein the Second
Circuit held that the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution did not nunc pro tunc
remove congressional participation. Id. at 1369.
22 Id. at 1370.
23 DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
24Id. at 1156.
25 361 F. Supp. at 562.
20 Pua. L. No. 91-672, § 1284 Stat. 2053 (January 12, 1971).
27 Appropriations Authorization-Military Procurement Act of 1972, PuB. L. No. 92-
156 § 601(a), 85 Stat. 423 (November 17, 1971). The Mansfield Amendment was a declara-
tion of policy only, without binding effect of law, and provided:
It is ... the policy of the United States to terminate at the earliest practicable
date all military operations of the United States in Indochina, and to provide for
the prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United States military forces at a date
1973"1
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war had occurred and that continued military activity without re-
newed congressional support was unlawful. This interpretation was
rejected by the Holtzman majority.
Judge Mulligan stated that whether the negotiated settlement
and the return of American forces and prisoners of war was such a
change as to require additional approval from Congress was a political
question. The court felt that such inquiry "involves diplomatic and
military intelligence which is totally absent in the record . . . , and
its digestion in any event is beyond judicial management.128 Thus the
court answered the question left open in DaCosta III, finding that the
significance of a "radical change" in the war was just as much a politi-
cal question as that of a winding down. Judge Oakes, dissenting, felt
there was a radical change in the character of the war which provided
the requisite "manageable standard."-29
Although the court held that whether new congressional partici-
pation was required for bombing in Cambodia was a political ques-
tion, it commented that Congress had in fact approved by appropria-
tionO the continued bombing until August 15, 1973. The significance
of the appropriation was disputed by the dissent which called it an
certain, subject to the release of all American prisoners of war . . . and an
accounting for all Americans missing in action ..
Id. The Amendment urged the President to establish a date for withdrawal of American
forces contingent only on the release of prisoners of war and accounting for missing in
action, to negotiate a cease-fire with North Vietnam, and to negotiate a safe, phased
withdrawal of United States forces in exchange for a phased release of United States
prisoners of war concurrent with the United States withdrawal. See DaCosta v. Laird
471 F.2d 1146, 1156-57 (2d Cir. 1973). But see DaCosta v. Nixon, 55 F.R.D. 145, 146-47,
(E.D.N.Y.), afJ'd without opinion, 456 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) (§ 601 has binding legal
effect).
28484 F.2d at 1312. The court cited with approval Mitchell v. Laird, - F.2d - (D.C.
Cir. 1973) and DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1157 (2d Cir. 1973), wherein both courts
stated that the effect of changed military activities was a political question. 484 F.2d
at 1312.
29 484 F.2d at 1315. He felt that under Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952), there was a manageable standard. In Youngstown, where the President
seized privately owned steel mills during the Korean war, the Court held that the
seizure was not pursuant to congressional authority, nor did the Constitution grant such
power to the President as Commander-in-Chief, nor would it be implied from, or in-
herent in, aggregate presidential powers granted in article II. Id. at 587.
In Youngstown there clearly was no congressional authority as contrasted with the
uncertainty of congressional participation in Holtzman. That the President did not
possess power as Commander-in-Chief, even during wartime, over the purely domestic
matter of seizing private property located entirely within the United States without con-
gressional approval is to be distinguished from the prosecution of a foreign war arguably
supported by Congress and initiated as a result of executive directed foreign policy. See
Affidavit of William P. Rogers, 484 F.2d at 1310 n.1.
30 484 F.2d at 1313. Accord, Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 853 (D. Mass. 1973). But see
Mitchell v. Laird, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 48:262
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acknowledgement of the President's power to bomb rather than a grant
of authority.3'
The Second Circuit, notwithstanding its finding that the extent
of congressional participation to constitute authorization presented a
nonjusticiable political question, considered plaintiffs' standing to bring
the suit. The court found that neither Congresswoman Holtzman nor
the Air Force officers qualified. With respect to the Air Force officers,
the majority felt that the appeal was mooted by their return to the
United States, there existing "nothing more than the merest possi-
bility" that they would be ordered to combat again. Mere taxpayer
or serviceman status would not suffice; for standing a serviceman must
be under orders to fight.32 As to Congresswoman Holtzman, the ma-
jority felt that she stood no better than a mere taxpayer, her con-
gressional vote having not been impaired in any way.33
When the bombing of Cambodia ceased on August 15, 1978, overt
American military involvement in southeast Asia became a subject
for history books.3 4 Holtzman v. Schlesinger personifies the end of a
31484 F.2d at 1317, quoting Senator Fullbright:
The acceptance of an August 15 cut off date should in no way be interpreted as
recognition by the committee of the President's authority to engage U.S. forces
in hostilities until that date. The view of most members of the committee has
been and continues to be that the President does not have such authority in the
absence of specific congressional approval.
119 CONG. REc. 12560 (daily ed. June 29, 1973).
It appears that such appropriation and draft extension acts are mote the result of
"[t]he de facto power of the President to present Congress with the fait accompli . . ."
than congressional assent to unilaterally initiated presidential war making. Note, Congress,
the President, and the Potem" to Comrnit Forces to Combat, 81 HAxv. L. REv. 1771, 1776
(1968).
32 484 F.2d at 1315. At the time the suit was commenced, the airmen.plaintiffs were
under orderg to engage in military activities over Cambodia. They had since been
returned to the United States and relieved of this military obligation. Id. But see
Mitchell v. Laird, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st
Cir. 1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970).
33484 F.2d at 1315. Contra, Mitchell v. Laird, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HAIv. L. Rav.
633, 635 (1971).
34 As the District of Columbia Circuit noted in Mitchell v. Laird:
Even if his predecessors had exceeded their constitutional authority, President
Nixon's duty did not go beyond trying, in good faith and to the best of his
ability, to bring the war to aft end as promptly as was consistent with the safety
of those fighting and with a profound concern for the durable interests of the
nation-its defense, its honor, its morality. Whether President Nixon did so
proceed is a question which at this stage in history a court is incompetent to
answer. A court cannot procure the relevant evidence: Some is in the hands of
foreign governments, some is privileged. Even if the necessary facts were to be
laid before it, a court would not substitute its judgment for that of the President,
who has an unusually wide measure of discretion in this area, and who should
not be judicially condemned except in a case of dear abuse amounting to bad
faith. Otherwise a court would be ignoring the delicades of diplomatic negotia-
tion, the inevitable bargaining for the best solution of an international conflict,
1973]
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struggle to stop a war which infected the United States. Perhaps now
of minimal importance, Holtzman will be noteworthy if the United
States ever again becomes embroiled in a "Vietnam." The recent pas-
sage of the Joint Congressional Resolution On War Powers35 effects
the methodology of the Second Circuit. This law, passed over President
Nixon's veto, requires the President to report to Congress within 48
hours after commitment of armed forces to foreign combat. Such com-
bat may be continued for only a 60 day period absent congressional
approval with a 30 day extension allowed to permit safe withdrawal.
Congress may, within this 90 day period, demand removal of American
forces by resolution, and such resolution would not be subject to veto.
By requiring affirmative congressional action to extend any troop com-
mitment this law hopefully will provide "judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" in the "twilight zone"36 of shared war-mak-
ing powers.
FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT - POLITICAL COMMITrEE
United States v. National Committee for Impeachment
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 19711 (FECA) imposes a
multitude of registration, reporting and disclosure requirements- on
and the scope which in foreign affairs must be allowed to the President if this
country is to play a responsible role in the council of the nations.
- F.2d at - (emphasis added).
35 H.R.J. Ras. 542, 119 CONG. Rac. 20093 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1973).
86 Regarding the exercise of concurrent or interrelated war powers by the President
and Congress, the remarks of Mr. Justice Jackson concurring in Youngstown are quite
appropriate:
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference
or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test
of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
343 U.S. at 637 (emphasis added).
' Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. I-IV, 86 Stat. 3 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 2, 18, 47 U.S.C.), formerly Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, 43
Stat. 1970. For the legislative history of the Act see 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1773.
A manual of regulations for the Act has been issued by the Comptroller General. See 37
Fed. Reg. 6156 et seq. (1972).
2 The disclosure requirements of the Act are codified in 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-41, 451-
54 (Supp. 1973). Section 443(a) requires any political committee which anticipates
receiving contributions of more than $1,000 in a calendar year to file a "statement of
organization." Section 443(b) sets forth what must be included in the statement, e.g., the
names and addresses of the committee's officers, the relationships of affiliated or connected
organizations, and the names and addresses of candidates being supported. Section 434
directs the treasurer of the committee to file and publish financial reports indicating
receipts and contributors, stating expenditures and identifying recipient candidates.
[Vol. 48:262
